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NOTE
ORIGIN OF THE MODERN STANDARD OF
DUE CARE IN NEGLIGENCE
Negligence is behavior that a reasonable man or woman would recog-
nize creates a "risk... of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law
regards as the utility of the act . ... - In many circumstances a
person escapes liability for the consequences of negligent behavior,2 but
the standard by which negligence is determined does not vary.3  Lead-
ing commentators,' and many courts,5 formulate the standard of due
care in terms of utility, as do some pattern jury instructions. 6 When
defined as an objective measure of utility, the standard by which negli-
gence is determined may be stated in mathematical terms 7and in dollar
amounts;' "utility" may then be synonymous with economic efficiency.9
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965).
2. Negligence is traditionally defined as the breach of a duty, see notes 30-62 infra
and accompanying text; liability may be avoided if there is no "antecedent duty to use
due care with respect to the interest invaded." James, Scope of Duty in Negligence
Cases, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 778, 778 (1953). Defendant may also escape liability if the
damages complained of are too remote or unforeseeable, see notes 47 & 53 infra and
accompanying text, or if plaintiff was negligent or assumed the risk. W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs §§ 65-68 (4th ed. 1971).
3. The standard, personified as the behavior expected of a "reasonable man,"
applies even to the insane. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (1965). Courts
acquire some latitude from the notion that circumstances limit the reasonable man's
behavior. A defendant's disabilities, including extreme youth, may be included in the
.circumstances," although courts purport to apply the same reasonable-man standard.
See, e.g., Charbonneau v. MacRury, 84 N.H. 501, 153 A. 457 (1931) (infant not
required to act as adult).
4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291-95 (1965); F. HARPER, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 72 (1933); F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 16.9 (1956); W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 31.
5. The leading modern cases are United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d
169 (2d Cir. 1947), and Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1940); earlier cases
are collected in several texts, see note 4 supra. See also notes 102-10 infra and
accompanying text.
6. See pattern instruction 101-H, CALIrORmI JURY INSTRUCTIONS--CiviL 236 (4th
ed. 1956).
7. See Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940).
8. See note 42 infra and accompanying text.
9. See note 16 infra and accompanying text.
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R.A. Posner has therefore defended continued use of the negligence
standard for liability as a means of producing the most efficient alloca-
tion of scarce resources. 10 Other writers have advocated a standard of
strict liability, denying that the application of the negligence standard
produces, in theory or in fact, an economically desirable result;" still
other commentators deny liability is, or should be, grounded on eco-
nomic theories.' 2
This Note will show that the modem test of negligence was founded
about 1900 on the practice of business enterprises and justified by eco-
nomic theory.
I. THE MODERN STANDARD OF DUE CARE
In the now widely accepted view of Jeremy Bentham, government
and laws should seek the greatest social good. 8 Given two additional
assumptions, this general proposition of Bentham's generates the stand-
ard of due care applied in negligence law. The first assumption is that
the risks and values weighed by individuals in varying circumstances are
always comparable: the determinants of behavior, whether conscious or
unconscious, are all of like kind. If this assumption is true, we can
aggregate risks and benefits in some meaningful way. The second
assumption is that the risks and values on which behavior is based can
be quantified, so that the magnitude of different aggregations of individ-
ual choices can be compared. If these two assumptions are valid, then
the purposes of individual actions can be summed. The intended
benefits of the behavior are its social good, and we can determine when
10. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 62-95 (1972).
11. G. CALABPnsr, THE CosT OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970); Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J.
1055 (1972).
12. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); Leff,
Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REv. 451
(1974).
13. By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or dis-
approves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it ap-
pears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest
is in question ....
A measure of government . . . may be said to be conformable to or dictated
by the principle of utility, when . . . the tendency which it has to augment
the happiness of the community is greater than any which it has to diminish it.
J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, in
1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAm 1-2 (1962; first published 1789).
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this overall benefit is maximized by adding the results of all behavior. A
government can secure the greatest social good simply by requiring each
individual to seek the greatest social good with each act, the require-
ment imposed by the law of negligence.' 4 If one or both of the
assumptions fail, however, Bentham's general principle cannot be trans-
lated into a rule of individual behavior. If the goals of personal
behavior cannot be added or compared in magnitude, one cannot
measure their social utility.
Whatever validity these two assumptions appeared to have in the early
nineteenth century, they no longer appear to be generally true.1 To-
day, we accept the existence of unconscious and irrational motives
unique to an individual's history and circumstances. When such mo-
tives operate, we cannot easily imagine how aims are to be measured or
compared. The overall social good cannot be a sum of irrational or
sadistic purposes.
In one area of human behavior, economic activity, however, we
continue to assume that people act on rational calculations of measura-
ble values. Economic theory attempts to describe those aspects of
behavior that can be reduced to a common numerical measure.' 6 Ben-
tham's view of the law, therefore, is particularly appropriate for regulat-
ing economic activity in which public policy generally assumes it is
possible to calculate and to produce the greatest social good.
In Bentham's time, as now, however, there were many competing
economic theories from which one could deduce different means of
efficiently producing and allocating scarce resources among members of
society."7 To prescribe the correct guide for individual conduct one had
to choose the correct economic theory.
The dominant economic theory in Bentham's time, as it is now, was
that first presented by Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations.'" That
14. See notes 23-28 infra and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., B. SKrNNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNrrY passim (1971).
16. Paul Samuelson accepts as one short description of economics, "the study of
those activities which, with or without money, involve exchange transactions among
people." P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 4 (8th ed. 1970). Exchanges require common
denominators, usually money. As an empirical science, economics also makes use of
other measurements, but quantitative measurement of some sort is essential to the
economic theories discussed in this Note.
17. See generally R. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS: THE LIvns, TIMES,
AND IDEAS OF THE GREAT ECONOMIC THINKERS (4th ed. 1972).
18. A. SMIrrH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NA-
TiONS (Penguin ed. Suffolk 1970) (1st ed. London 1776).
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work was a part of Smith's effort to set out the natural laws of society as
Newton had described the laws of inanimate creation. Smith thought
he had found the laws that impelled each person to assist in carrying out
the divine plan:
[B]y acting according to the dictates of our moral faculties, we neces-
sarily pursue the most effectual means of promoting the happiness of
mankind, and may therefore be said in some sense to co-operate with
the Deity and to advance, as far as in our power, the Plan of Provi-
dence.19
Smith argued that in economic dealings people were generally motivated
by the desire for personal gain, their "selfish propensities": "It is not
from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we
expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self interest." 20
The Wealth of Nations asserted that the greatest economic good
would result from the efforts of each person to secure the greatest profit
for himself. Competition in a free marketplace would benefit those
workers and businessmen best able to employ scarce resources in satisfy-
ing the wants of others,2 ' so that the marketplace would translate private
profit into social good.22
The theories of Bentham and Smith, taken together, 23 clearly define
the role of government and law with regard to economic activity. The
greatest public good will be realized when all persons calculate private
profit and loss accurately and are free to act on those calculations.
Whenever behavior, such as the making or selling of goods, is subject to
the operation of the marketplace, the greatest prosperity will result from
the operation of the market itself, without government interference. To
maximize the public economic welfare, government need merely require
each individual to calculate, as a cost or benefit to himself, all results of
his actions.24 If injury to others might result from planned behavior, the
19. Id. at 27.
20. Id. at 119.
21. Id. at 459-60.
22. Id. at 460-62.
23. Bentham wholeheartedly adopted the economic theory of Adam Smith, see E.
PATTERsoN, JUIUsPRtDBNcE 454 (1953), and the work of the two men was generally
accepted as a single whole: "I would say that the Manchester men were the disciples of
Adam Smith and Bentham, while the Philosophical Radicals followed Bentham and
Adam Smith." L. HOBHOUSE, LmERALisM 44 n.1 (9th ed. 1964), quoting F. HmsT, TH1
MANCHESmR SCHOOL (no date or page given), on the origin of the dominant nineteenth
century Liberal philosophy.
24. Economists now refer to aspects of the world not subject to exchange as
[Vol. 1976:447
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actor must calculate whether his own profit will exceed that risk; if it
will, he may proceed, and the social good will be enhanced even if
predictable injury to others results in some cases.
To derive the modem law of negligence from these assumptions we
need only add a conclusion: Whenever a person engages in behavior
likely to increase the net social good, he will not be held liable for
injuries to others in the course of his action; conversely, he will be
obliged to recompense others if he injures them without adequate justifi-
cation. Guided by such a rule, rational persons will avoid injuring
others needlessly, thereby advancing the public welfare with the least
possible constraint on individual freedom.
The shifting of loss to the one who errs may also reflect society's
judgment that the negligent party is more blameworthy; many writers
have noted the apparent moral component of the notion of "fault."25
The moralist and the economic view of law need not contradict. R.A.
Posner suggests that the blame attached to negligent behavior derives
from social "indignation" at the waste of resources and thus disposes of
other proffered justifications for imposing liability on the party at fault:
If indignation has its roots in inefficiency, we do not have to decide
whether regulation, or compensation, or retribution, or some mixture of
these best describes the dominant purpose of negligence law. In any
case, the judgment of liability depends ultimately on a weighing of costs
and benefits. 6
In short, once we choose a utilitarian standard, there may be many
reasons for imposing punishment on those who fail to meet it.27  The
"externalities." G. BANNOCK, R. BAXTER & R. REEs, THE PENGUIN DIcnoNARY OF
ECONOMICS 158-59 (1972). To subject such values to the presumably beneficient
workings of the marketplace the government need only levy a tax on, or provide a
subsidy for, behavior affecting this value, forcing each individual to "internalize" the
externality by taking account of the penalty or benefit attached. Thus, the government
levies a tax on pollutants, and industry must thenceforward count clean air and water as
a cost of doing business. This extension of economic theory to other fields is called
"welfare economics," P. SAMUELSON, supra note 16, at 454, and is most closely identified
with the work of the economist A.C. Pigou. See, e.g., A. PIGOU, WEALTH AND WELFARE
(1912).
25. See, e.g., O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 69-76 (M. Howe ed. 1963) and
authorities cited therein.
26. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STuD. 29, 33-34 (1972).
27. There must be some reason for imposing liability on the defendant besides
plaintiff's need for compensation, or there would be no point in shifting, at considerable
expense, the burden of the injury from one party to another. Several rationales are
available. See generally MacKenzie, Some Reflections on Negligence, Damages and No-
Number 3]
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Bentham-Smith scheme requires only that the punishment induce utili-
tarian behavior.
The utilitarian standard for determining negligence is simply stated:
One should take all precautions less costly than the injuries they pre-
vent.2" The form of expression implies that it can be translated into
mathematical terms and into dollar amounts when economic behavior is
in question. This translation may be possible, at least in theory, when
the standard is used to judge past behavior. As a guide to future action,
however, the utilitarian standard is difficult and perhaps impossible to
apply, as its mathematical expression will demonstrate.
IT. THE MATHEMATICAL ExPRESSION OF THE STANDARD
Judge Learned Hand was the first to use quasi-mathematical lan-
guage to set the standard of due care:
The degree of care demanded of a person by an occasion is the resultant
of three factors: the likelihood that his conduct will injure others, taken
with the seriousness of the injury if it happens, and balanced against
the interest which he must sacrifice to avoid the risk.29
Fault Compensation, 10 U. Barr. COLUM. L. REv. 27 (1975). A deterrent effect is
consistent with the economic rationale; deterrence is a more likely motive than the
"indignation" Posner imagines we feel at the waste of resources. Every person, knowing
that he will bear the cost of injuries resulting from his unreasonable actions, will pru-
dently follow the standard of reasonable care required by law; all "externalities" will
hence be internalized, and government can extend the benefits of the free market to all
human activity. Whether individuals behave in this fashion is another matter. Sec
notes 38-43 infra and accompanying text.
28. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 11, at 1057; Posner, supra note 26, at 32-
33; Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 206 (1973). Posner
explains:
When the cost of accidents is less than the cost of prevention, a rational profit-
maximizing enterprise will pay tort judgments to the accident victims rather
than incur the larger cost of avoiding liability. Furthermore, overall economic
value or welfare would be diminished rather than increased by incurring a
higher accident-prevention cost in order to avoid a lower accident cost. If,
on the other hand, the benefits in accident avoidance exceed the costs of pre-
vention, society is better off than if those costs are incurred and the accident
averted, and so in this case the enterprise is made liable, in the expectation
that self-interest will lead it to adopt the precautions in order to avoid a
greater cost in tort judgments.
Perhaps, then, the dominant function of the fault system is to generate rules
of liability that if followed will bring about, at least approximately the ef-
ficient-the cost-justified-level of accidents and safety.
Posner, supra note 26, at 33.
29. Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940).
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Hand immediately followed this statement with a caution that the "fac-
tors" were "practically not susceptible of any quantitative estimate" 30; he
thought, however, that ordinary negligence was distinguishable from
gross negligence because the former could be "described in quantita-
tive terms." 3 Hand apparently meant, correctly, that a mathematical
expression need not be reduced to numerical values to retain its mean-
ing. In United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,32 Judge Hand returned to
the subject, explicitly resorting to algebra to define the standard of
care. In Carroll Towing, a barge broke loose from her moorings and
damaged other vessels. The defendant owner's duty, Hand found,
as in other similar situations, to provide against resulting injuries is a
function of three variables: (1) the probability that she [the barge]
will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3)
the burden of adequate precautions. Possibly it serves to bring this no-
tion into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if the probability be called
P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends on whether B is
less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL.33
Other formulations of the standard of due care have a mathematical
cast. Henry Terry's often-quoted formulation 4 divides the reasonable-
ness of a risk into five factors: 1) the magnitude of the risk; 2) the
value of what is risked (the principal object); 3) the value of the object
for which the risk is taken (the collateral object); 4) the probability the
collateral object will be obtained; 5) the probability the collateral object
would not be obtained without taking the risk. 35 These factors are
expressed in words that strongly imply quantification -"magnitude,"
"value," "probability"36 -and must be balanced against each other in a
manner strongly suggestive of algebra. Terry's first and second factors
are the equivalent of Hand's "product" of the magnitude of injury and
the probability of its occurrence. Factors four and five together give the
amount by which the probability of attaining the collateral object is
increased by taking the risk. Factor three is the value of the collateral
object. If we follow Hand in defining due care as an algebraic inequali-
ty, Terry's formulation is that liability will attach when:
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
33. Id. at 173.
34. Terry, Negligence, 29 HALv. L. REv. 40, 43 (1915).
35. Id. at 42-43.
36. Id.
Number 3] 453
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(P - P')B < P"L
where B = collateral object;
L = principal object;
P = probability of attaining the collateral object by taking the
risk;
F' = probability collateral object would have been obtained
without taking -the risk;
(P P- ') = the increase in the probability of attaining the
collateral object which results from taking the risk (a posi-
tive number);
P" = the probability of injury to the principal object.
In Carroll Towing,37 the principal object was the interest of the other
barge owners in avoiding damage; the collateral object was the defend-
ant owner's avoidance of the expense of providing a watchman. By
dispensing with a night watchman, the defendant increased the proba-
bility of achieving the collateral object from zero to unity. In these
circumstances Terry's expression simplifies to
B < P"L
which is identical to the formulation of Judge Hand, demonstrating the
formal equivalence of the two statements of the standard of due care.
Since the standard is to be used by a reasonable man in planning his
actions, the risk of loss is really a sum of all the possible injuries that
might result from the action, weighted by their respective probabilities.
When the burden is a monetary cost, as it usually is, the "collateral
object" for which the risk is taken is a range of possible profits or
advantages of varying probabilities altered by the act. A more general
and accurate form of Terry's and Hand's inequality when used as a
guide would therefore be,
(P1-P)Bl + (P2 -P 2')B 2 + . (P.-P.')B.
< PI" Ll + P2" 1 2 + --... P." Lm
where the subscripts n and m designate the different possible benefits
and losses that might result from a given action and their corresponding
probabilities. The values of n and m, and therefore the number of
terms on each side of the inequality, would be infinite in most instances
because the consequences of an act spread outward in space and time
like ripples in a pond. The probabilities of more distant events occur-
ing as the result of a given action will decline toward zero, but the size
of the benefit or loss of remote consequences may be indefinitely large,
37. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
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on the principal of the nursery rhyme: for want of a nail, a kingdom
was lost. No terms in the sequence, therefore, can be neglected before-
hand, and the reasonable man cannot significantly reduce the complex-
ity of the calculation. In some instances the reasonable man may be able
to translate the unwieldy infinite series given above into a problem in
calculus. There are clearly practical questions, however, even if a man-
ageable general expression can be written, whether the values of the
probability, benefit and loss can be even approximately determined;
whether anyone could actually make these complex calculations in ad-
vance of an act; or whether a judge or jury could use them to weigh
the reasonableness of the risk taken. Further, there is a serious ques-
tion whether the mathematical expressions developed here have any
meaning before the fact. The sums on the two sides of the inequality
will both be infinite unless the series each converge-unless the size of
possible injuries, for instance, is such that increasingly large injuries be-
come increasingly improbable at a rate that assures the sum of all the
terms on the right will be a finite number.39 There is no reason to think
that this will be the case in most circumstances.
One way to give the inequality meaning would be to set an arbitrary
cut-off on the value of P, defining probabilities below that value as
injuries or benefits too remote or unforeseeable to take into account.
This would give the notion of "proximate cause" a precise meaning.
How this cut-off could be set, however, is unclear. It would itself be a
variable: Very large accidents of very small probability should be taken
into account, for instance, while small accidents of small probability
should not. In short, Hand's mathematical expression would not, even
in theory, be solvable unless further complicating assumptions were
added.
It is difficult to see how any of these objections to Hand's inequality
can be avoided if it is to be used as a general guide to behavior. Clearly,
the inequality only has practical meaning as a post hoe means of
evaluating actual injuries and benefits. When used in retrospect,
the inequality presents fewer problems. The costs, benefits, and
probabilities attaching to each possible action can be calculated and
reduced to common numerical terms. While difficult, these cal-
38. See generally R. COURANT & F. JOHN, INTRODUCTION TO CALCULUS AN
ANALYSIS (1965).
39. See A. GOODMAN, 1 MODERN CALCULUS Wrr A ALYrIc GnoMETRY 597-641
(1967).
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culations would not be impossible for a large organization with
extensive records of the consequences of past actions. All the variables
in the inequality can be stated, in theory, in dollar terms; juries must
reduce the effects of negligence to a dollar amount in all tort suits. 40
The probability of any event can be expressed as a number, and, of
course, measures to prevent most injuries can be translated into dollar
costs. It has become common in recent years to state even aesthetic and
environmental values in numerical terms41 and to count the cost of
complex human activities, with potential losses of lives and health, as a
present dollar value.42
The economic interpretation of the standard depends on the assump-
tion that individuals can make use of it, in advance of an action, in
planning their behavior. Given the complexity of the calculation in-
volved in using such a standard before the possibilities have been
narrowed, and the improbability of any single individual having the
needed information in usual circumstances, this assumption does not
recommend itself except for use by large enterprises. 4  If we do assume
that the standard of utility is used as a guide to behavior, however, the
40. See 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 135, 136.
41. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1123
(D.C. Cir. 1971); CosS OF ENGINEERS, U.S. DEPT. OF THE ARMY, ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT, WALLIsVILLE LAKE, TRINIrY RIVER, TEXAS 94 (1971), quoted in
Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1365-66 (S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd sub nom.
Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974).
42. See, e.g., 4 ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT: LIQUID METAL FAST BREEDER REACTOR
PROGRAM § 11 (1974) (estimating the present dollar value of different plants for the
nation's electric power industry as a whole over the next 30 years). A theoretical basis
for translating subjective values into objective measures is given by J. DEWEY, THEORY
OF VALUATION (1939) and a more recent work, P. CAWS, SCIENCE AND THE THEORY OF
VALUE (1967), treating values as statements about desired outcomes.
43. While it is theoretically possible to assign numerical values to the terms in
Hand's inequality or its expanded and more general form, one may still question the
ability of individuals to obtain the required information. It is possible, however, that
juries can make the narrower determination required after the event has narrowed the
range of possibile injuries and benefits. The Delphi technique of forecasting, developed
at the RAND Corporation, 0. HELMER, SOCIAL TECHNOLOGY (1966), uses panels of
laymen to develop estimates of the value of probabilities or other values not known
precisely to any of the panel members; such panels, which in some ways resemble juries,
have been able to make reasonably precise estimates and predictions. See generally R.
AYRES, TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING AND LONG-RANGE PLANNING (1969); E. JANTSCH,
TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING IN PERSPECTIVE (1972). If juries do apply the Hand test,
their verdicts can be predicted, of course, and the Hand inequality is a mathematical
model of jury deliberation. This possibility is open to empirical test by anyone with
sufficient motive and funds.
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economic interpretation of the standard is straightforward. The terms
of the inequality stating the standard can be given precise expression as
dollar values; the standard becomes a requirement that all actions be
profitable. There is no requirement that each action be the most
profitable to society or to the actor; laissez-faire economic theory pre-
dicts that when each individual guides his decisions according to their
profitablility to himself, overall economic benefit to society will be maxi-
mized." Prospective profits are notoriously difficult to calculate: Only
large business enterprises, which have access to extensive information
about the consequences of past activities and the costs of new ones, are
likely to find the utilitarian standard easy, or even possible, to apply
without frequent error when planning their actions.
One should avoid all risks "of such magnitude as to outweigh what
the law regards as the utility of the act . . . . 4 This requirement
seems so logical that one might conclude that a utilitarian standard has
always been the measure of reasonable behavior.4 6  A conscious effort
is needed to see that balancing the value of an action against its risks is a
modem notion, which ordinary individuals will find difficult or impossi-
ble to apply. Until recently, the law imposed a much less demanding
requirement.
IlI. THE STANDARD OF CUSTOM
In tracing the origin of the modem standard of due care, one need not
resolve the much-disputed questions about the origin of negligence ac-
tions.4 7  By the beginning of the eighteenth century, well before Adam
Smith wrote, negligence was accepted as a basis of liability in some
forms of action. 48  The question for the present inquiry is what standard
of behavior was required once negligence itself had been recognized.
44. See notes 13-23 supra and accompanying text.
45. See note 1 supra.
46. The utilitarian standard was set forth in the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 291
(1934), and in successive editions of W. PXossER, supra note 2, without any indication
that any other standard of "reasonableness" had ever been used by the courts.
47. In one widely held view, negligence developed from actions in trespass and
trespass on the case. See, e.g., Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37
VA. L. REv. 359 (1951). Prosser sees negligence as a separate ground of liability
emerging within several forms of action, ultimately taking the form of trespass on the
case because of the convenience of that form. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 28, at
139-40. See generally Peck, Negligence and Liability Without Fault in Tort Law, 46
WASH. L. Rav. 225 (1971).
48. 8 W. HOLDSWoRTH, A IsToRY OF ENGLISH LAw 452 (2d ed. 1937).
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The earliest cases that dealt clearly with negligence defined it as a
departure from custom. The leading case of Tuberville v. Stampe,49
decided in 1697, began with the formula, "Case grounded upon the
custom of the realm for negligently keeping of his fire . . ... 0 While
the literal meaning of such formulas should not be heavily weighted, the
evidence indicates that when negligence began to appear as a separate
basis of liability, the standard for determining negligence was simply the
common custom or the approved mode of behavior of the time.51 As
Abraham Harari put it,
[The courts] first hit on the notion of negligence: conduct that was
wrongful in the circumstances, an omission to do what ought to have
been done or the doing of something that ought not to have been done.
In the typical situations of every-day life in a comparatively stable soci-
ety, what ought or ought not to have been done in given circumstances
is usually quite obvious. No complex theory is required. It is held that
defendant ought to have done X when in the circumstances a normal
person would have done X.r
This statement of the early law of negligence is consistent with the
position taken by Holdsworth. 53 As Holdsworth noted, it was natural
that such a standard should be embodied in the notion of an ordinarily
prudent man, and be objective by embodying the behavior expected of
an ordinary person in the circumstances. 4 Although the standard of
the ordinarily prudent man was not explicitly laid down until 1837 in
Vaughan v. Menlove,5 5 Holdsworth found it amply visible in earlier
cases.
56
By the early nineteenth century, the idea of negligence as a departure
from normal or approved behavior had emerged from the concealing
49. Turberville v. Stampe, 1 Ld. Raym. 264, 91 Eng. Rep. 1072 (K.B. 1697).
50. Id.
51. For a fuller discussion of this point, see A. HARAM, THE PLACE OF NEOLIOENC E
IN TBE LAW op TORTS (1962).
52. Id. at 105. Harari's statement is correct, but the implication that British society
was simple or stable is gratuitous. Law based on custom need not be, and was not in
Britain, merely primitive; the use of custom was a part of complex views about the law
and the world. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
53. See 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 48, at 499-50.
54. Id. at 450.
55. 3 Bing. N.C. 468, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837). Negligence had long been a
basis of liability in cases of bailment; the court chose as the test of negligence the "rule
adopted in cases of bailment, as laid down in Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raymond 909 [92
Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B. 1703)]; the standard of the ordinary prudent man." Id.
56. See 8 W. HoLwswoRTH, supra note 48, at 449-50.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1976/iss3/4
DUE CARE IN NEGLIGENCE
medieval forms of action and by 1837 had been clearly formulated in
terms of the behavior of an ordinary person: "The care taken by a
prudent man has always been the rule laid down . . . . 7 The standard
itself in specific circumstances, as well as the question whether a depar-
ture from the standard had occurred, were for the jury to determine,58
which further suggests that these were matters of fact and that the
standard of due care was simply the ordinary course of behavior.
Whether the standard of custom was prescriptive or descriptive was
not a matter of concern in the early nineteenth century. Interest in
empirical information about human behavior is modem; the reasonable-
man standard was founded on the older assumption that people behaved
as they ought. That is the assumption, of course, of the philosophy of
natural law, the body of beliefs that pervaded British jurisprudence in
the eighteenth century:59
Within the last century and a quarter, or thereabouts, the whole doctrine
of negligence has been built up on the foundation of holding every man
answerable for at least the amount of prudence which might be expected
of an average reasonable man in the circumstances. Now St. Germain
pointed out as early as the sixteenth century that the terms "reason"' and
"reasonable" denote for the common lawyer the ideas which the civilian
or canonist puts under the head of "Law of Nature." Thus natural law
may fairly claim, in principle though not by name, the reasonable man
of English and American law and all his works, which are many.60
57. Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. N.C. 468, 475, 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493 (C.P.
1837).
58. See O.W. HOLMES, supra note 25, at 97-103 (jury should establish standard of
care initially; after certain conduct is consistently labelled negligent, it should be
negligence per se).
59. Blackstone's COMMENTAJuEs were an expression of their author's belief that the
law of England reflected a rational natural order perceptible to the unaided reason, an
order determined by God. See generally D. BOoRSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCiENCE OF THE
LAW (1941 ). This view that society was, like the natural world, governed by reasonable
principles, was widely shared in the Great Britain of the later 1700's. Id. See also A.
SMrH. supra note 18. If the usual behavior of people in society is determined by divine
plan, then the distinction between prescription and description of course disappears.
Departure from custom is transgression of moral law.
60. F. POLLOCK, ESSAYS iN TE LAW 69 (1922). In approving this view, the court in
Beidler & Bookmyer, Inc. v. Universal Ins. Co., 134 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1943), noted that,
"The 'reasonable man' . . . was the common law way of taking over the 'Natural Law'
concepts of the Roman law and of Scholastic jurisprudence." Id. at 830 n.7. In addition
to the similarity of the reasonable man and Natural Law concepts, we can see a direct
line of descent of the reasonable man via the rule adopted for bailments, see note 55
,upra, in Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Id. Raym. 909, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B. 1703), in which
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In the early nineteenth century, therefore, negligence was a departure
from customary behavior, which was at once a variation from the usual
and a violation of moral precept. An alternative mode of expression
was, therefore, to say that negligence was a breach of a duty.
Obedience to duties ordained by God should not produce undesirable
results. Injuries therefore could be of only two kinds: the result of
unlawful acts or omissions (breaches of duty); and unavoidable acci-
dents, the consequences of inscrutable Acts of God which could not be
forestalled even by a proper observance of duty. If a ship's captain
failed to perform what was needed in a storm, some injuries might be
traced to his breach of duty, but others would be traced to the storm
itself. The captain could be liable only for the consequences of his own
unlawful failure to conform to customary prudence. 01 Liability was
found when the damage complained of was the result of a breach of
duty, and not when it was the consequence of some Act of God.
Holdsworth points out that this distinction between the unhappy effects
of departure from custom and unavoidable accident was central to the
development of negligence.6
"Acts of God" came to be called "unforeseeable," ' 8 which meant only
that a reasonable person would not properly take them into account. In
Galveston, Houston & San Antonio Railway v. Crier,04 decided in 1907,
there was evidence that defendant's train had proceeded over rotten
track in the face of an evident storm. The storm was unusually severe
and the court found it was a "cyclone," an Act of God. Quoting
copiously from the Bible, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that the
defendant railroad was under no duty to take Acts of God into its
accounting. "'Tis the path designed for the cyclone by Him 'the
Holt, C.J., imported liability for negligence from the Roman law. See C. FIFOOT,
HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAw: TORT AND CONTRACT 173 (1949).
61. Cf. Gorris v. Scott, L.R. 9 Ex. 125 (1874) (ship's captain not liable for loss
overboard of livestock due to failure to comply with public health order). A careful
analysis of such cases is given in A. HARAJ, supra note 51, at 43-100.
62. See 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 48, at 450.
63. See Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Crier, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 434, 436-37, 100
S.W. 1177, 1178-79 (1907):
[A cyclone] must be regarded the act of God . . . . If then, it be shown by
the evidence that a cyclone was the cause of the wreck, . . . the very evi-
dence that shows the derailment, proves its cause to be one that could not be
anticipated and provided against ....
64. Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Crier, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 434, 100 S.W. 1177
(1907).
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thunder of whose power none can understand,"' the court concluded
somewhat obscurely. 65 After thus implying that it would have been
blasphemous for the railroad or its engineer to attempt to foresee a
cyclone, the court quoted Pollock:
A reasonable man can be guided only by a reasonable estimate of prob-
abilities . . . . The reasonable man ...will neither neglect what he
can foresee as probable, nor waste his time and anxiety on events that
are barely possible.66
The improbable or unforeseeable was by definition an Act of God.67
Since the standard was the behavior expected of, and observed by, the
ordinary person, taking into account all that was foreseeable, juries were
permitted to apply this self-evident standard to the circumstances of each
case without further legal instruction, and to decide whether the defend-
ant's behavior conformed with what was required. The result was a
body of case law which prescribed specific patterns of behavior for
specific circumstances, but lacked any unifying principle more specific
than that of the behavior of a reasonable person. The first effort to
codify the new law of torts, Addison's Treatise,"" was an enormous cata-
logue of the rights of person and property, and the specific acts which
had been found to violate such rights under particular circumstances.
Addison defined negligence simply as the breach of a duty to use due
care, 9 and in the overall plan of the treatise there was no need for fur-
ther analysis. Duties were simply correlative to rights and "due care"
was whatever a jury of ordinary people found it to be in specific cir-
cumstances. As Clerk and Lindsell saw the situation late in the nine-
teenth century:
These degrees of care, however, it is impossible to define or classify, for
they are infinite in number, each special set of circumstances requiring
its own particular degree; so that an exhaustive catalogue of the various
degrees of care would be a simple enumeration of all the decided cases.
It is in each case practically a question of fact for the jury, whether the
65. Id. at 439, 100 S.W. at 1180. The source of the quoted phrase is not indicated.
66, Id., quoting F. POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS: A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF
OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM CIVIL WRONGS IN THE COMMON LAw 36 (1887).
67. See notes 61-65 supra and accompanying text.
68. 2 C. ADDISON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR WRONGS & THEIR
REMEDIES (H. Wood ed. 1880) (1st ed. London 1860).
69. 1 Id. at 36: "'The action for negligence proceeds upon the idea of an obligation
on the part of the defendant towards the plaintiff to use care, and a breach of that
obligation to the plaintiff's injury."' Id., quoting Swan v. North British Australasian
Co., 7 H. & N. 603, 636, 158 Eng. Rep. 611, 625 (Exch. 1862).
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proper degree of care has been taken-the jury being guided by consid-
erations of what a reasonable and prudent man would have done under
the circumstances.7 °
Neither the opaque generality of the "reasonable and prudent man"
standard nor the catalogue of the cases explained the law of negligence
in a satisfactory way, however, or gave much guidance about what
would be found negligent in a case of first impression. In his lectures
on the common law published in 1881, therefore, Holmes set out to
discover the "common ground at the bottom of all liability in
tort .... ,,71 Holmes found this common ground in the principle that
a person would be liable for the foreseeable consequences of his ac-
tions.7 2
This was a clear statement of negligence law at that time in terms
that seemed to make its operation more understandable. We must,
however, be careful not to give a modem probabilistic meaning to the
term "foreseeable," which at the time Holmes wrote still was used in
dichotomous fashion to distinguish the results of human activity, which
were always "foreseeable" no matter how unlikely, and Acts of God,
which were unforeseeable, no matter how frequent. Against Acts
of God people were powerless to protect themselves. Holmes cited
Chief Justice Nelson of the New York Court of Appeals as authority for
the formulation of the "foreseeability" standard:
All the cases concede that an injury arising from inevitable accident, or,
which in law or reason is the same thing, from an act that ordinary
human care and foresight are unable to guard against, is but the misfor-
tune of the sufferer, and lays no foundation for legal responsibility. 73
Holmes gave no further definition of what is foreseeable, but it is clear
he approved the Chief Justice's drawing a sharp line between those
events that are foreseeable and those that are not. This notion was quite
different from modem ideas of graduated probability; an event was
either foreseeable, according to Holmes, in which case precautions were
to be taken, or it was not, and any damages were to fall on the suf-
ferer.74  Holmes gave no indication of how the two causes of events
70. J. CLERK & W. LINDSELL, THE LAw oF ToRTs 413 (8th ed. 1929).
71. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 25, at 63.
72. Id. at 76-77.
73. Id. at 76, quoting Harvey v. Dunlop, Hill & Den., 193 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843).
74. Id. at 76: 'The general principle of our law is that loss from accident must lie
where it falls. . . . [R]elatively to a given human being, anything is accident which he
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were to be distinguished, and apparently assumed that events which
were "foreseeable" were self-evidently so. But all the consequences of
an act which are possible are conceivable and so might be foreseen. The
distinction of "foreseeable" events evidently rests on what ordinary
people do, in fact, foresee.7 5 The standard of foreseeability, unless no-
tions of probability are introduced, is simply the standard of custom
based on experience.7r
Holmes was not trying to innovate, but to state the principles of the
law as it then existed: His further discussion of negligence shows that he
felt no need, and had no intention, to alter the basis of liability as it had
then existed for at least fifty years. Holmes could have been summariz-
ing Addison's Treatise when he wrote:
[T]he featureless generality, that the defendant was bound to use such
care as a prudent man would do under the circumstances, ought to be
continually giving place to the specific one, that he was bound to use
this or that precaution under these or those circumstances.77
Holmes then developed his famous argument that when juries had
repeatedly found a certain pattern of behavior to be required under
certain circumstances, courts should thereafter have refused to submit
such cases to juries and held as a matter of law that the repeatedly
prescribed behavior was always required.78  Holmes was clearly in
accord with earlier commentators such as Addison, Clerk and Lind-
sell, and the courts of the nineteenth century: No standard more
specific than that of reason in general could be stated, but the examples
of due care and prudent behavior could be, and were, collected and
used as a set of patterns of duty or lawful action.
The use of the term "foreseeability" to distinguish between conse-
quences of breaches of duty and of Acts of God is also in the work of
Pollock, who in 1887 published another well-known codification of the
law of torts.79 Pollock, who conducted a long correspondence with
Holmes, discussed foreseeability in some detail; his more extended treat-
ment clearly established the word's meaning. The discussion concerned
could not fairly have been expected to contemplate as possible, and therefore to avoid."
75. Id. at 78: "[Unless under the circumstances a prudent man would have
foreseen the possibility of harm," there is no negligence.
76, See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 179-80 (1884) (prosecution for
negligent homicide) (Holmes, J.): "Common experience is necessary to the man of
ordinary prudence ..
77. Id. at 89.
78. Id. at 89-92.
79. F. POLLOCK, supra note 66.
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"the doctrine of 'natural and probable consequences.! ,, "Natural"
and "probable" were near synonyms: unexpected events were outside
the natural order, and not to be foreseen:
[A] person is expected to anticipate and guard against all reasonable
consequences, but. . . he is not, by the law of England, expected to
anticipate and guard against that which no reasonable man would expect
to occur .... 81
This language of "expectation" evokes in a modem reader thoughts of
probabilities, but Pollock, like Holmes, drew a sharp line between those
events a person was to take into account and those beyond his power to
prevent, that he was not to consider. He discussed the "line" bounding
the foreseeable: "We shall now give examples on either side of the
line."'8 2 There was no discussion of balancing probabilities against the
effort of precaution because the test of foreseeabiity was whether the
damages in the case were to be attributed to the defendant's behavior
or to an Act of God. In the ten examples given by Pollock, the question
of remoteness or foreseeability of damage was distinct from the ques-
tion whether the defendant's behavior was negligent: "a Trinity House
cutter had by negligent navigation stuck on a shoal," and the question
was whether defendant's negligence or a strong wind was the cause of
damage to a wall; two contractors had been negligent in repairing a
road, and the question was whether an injury to a passerby should be
attributed to one of them; and so forth. 8 Probability and foreseeability
were not part of the standard of behavior, which at that time was
determined by the ordinary person's behavior; foreseeability defined the
damages for which a defendant would be held liable, in Pollock's
scheme.
This formulation in terms of what we would now call proximate cause
does not conflict with Holmes's definition of negligent behavior. Ac-
cording to Holmes, the law required one to foresee that which the
ordinary person foresaw, and to protect against the hazards which were
ordinarily foreseen and avoided. 4 Pollock's more detailed treatment
makes it clear that, even when one departed from the ordinary standard
of behavior, one was not held liable for the fortuitous conjunction of that
negligence and an accident against which ordinary foresight would have
80. Id. at 36-45.
81. Id. at 37, quoting Greenland v. Chaplin, 5 Exch. 243, 248, 155 Eng. Rep. 104,
106 (1850) (emphasis added).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 37-43.
84. O.W. HOLmE.S, supra note 25, at 75-77.
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been ineffective. 5 In both formulations liability arose only on a depar-
ture from the "natural and probable." The events which people ordi-
narily foresaw were defined as probable, and foreseeability and custom
were inextricably mixed.
This highly compressed summary of the history of the law of negli-
gence takes us to the end of the nineteenth century, and shows a gradual
elaboration but no sharp departure from the test of negligent behavior.
Negligence was a departure from reason and custom which were the
same, a departure in itself wrongful. The ideas of objective probability
and the balancing of costs and benefits had not yet appeared.
IV. THE STANDARD OF UTILITY
Henry Terry was the first person to state the modem standard of due
care in complete detail, and it is his formulation86 that has since been
followed. Terry and later commentators, however, seem to have been
unaware of the degree to which, in 1915, he departed from existing
law.8" Once stated, the rule seemed so transparently the definition of
"reasonableness" that later writers have failed to note what a considera-
ble innovation it was. 88
85. F. POLLOCK, supra note 66, at 41-46.
86. Terry, supra note 34, at 43.
87. Throughout the essay, Terry seems to follow Holmes, and in his definition of a
"reasonable" risk does not indicate in any way that he is departing from Holmes.
88. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965), which states the general
principle, for example, cites only six cases earlier than Terry's essay of which only one
clearly supports the utility-of-risk rule. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Krayenbuhl, 65 Neb.
889, 91 N.W. 880 (1902), see notes 103-17 infra and accompanying text. A search of
the early authorities quoted by others in support of the utility-of-risk rule reveals only
one other case of arguably clear precedent: Van Schaick v. Hudson River R.R., 43 N.Y.
527 (1871). In this curious case, plaintiff was struck by a locomotive when he stepped
behind a car in a switch yard to relieve himself. The court found the plaintiff
contributorily negligent, basing its holding on the "urgency which was upon him alone,
and which he had no right, in his duty [of modesty] to others, to permit to overcome his
care for himself." Id. at 533. The analysis is in terms of strict and inflexible duties, but
the court does seem to balance the importance of one duty, modesty, against another,
self-preservation, in their importance to society.
The other cases cited by the Restatement are more doubtful. Galveston, H. & S.A.Ry.
v. Crier, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 434, 100 S.W. 1177 (1907), see notes 64-67 supra, holds an
Act of God the cause of damages. Also cited is Gavin v. City of Chicago, 97 Ill. 66
(1880) (child injured by swing bridge), which includes a perfunctory discussion of the
cost and unavailability of safeguards. In Gavin, however, the court flatly holds that the
city had no duty to make bridges safe for children to play upon-the injuries were "mere
accident." Id. at 71. In Eckert v. Long Island Ry., 43 N.Y. 502 (1871), see notes 90-
96 infra, plaintiff's decedent acted in accord with duty in risking his life to save that of a
child, and he was not contributorily negligent. In Congdon v. City of Norwich, 37
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Terry argued that whether behavior in given circumstances was negli-
gent was to be determined, not by consulting previous cases with similar
factual patterns, but by measuring the behavior against five factors, 80
which taken together defined what we would now call the utility of the
behavior: whether the aim sought by the defendant was important
enough to justify the risks taken. Perhaps because it seemed so clearly
correct, Terry cited no authority for this analysis of "reasonable" or for
his factors, and in truth little authority then existed. Terry contented
himself with the single "example" of the fact situation in Eckert v. Long
Island Railroad,9° a suit for negligence brought by the widow of a man
who had dashed onto a railroad track to rescue a small child from the
path of a negligently operated locomotive. The rescuer saved the child's
life, but was himself killed by the train. In defense, the railroad claimed
the rescuer had been negligent in risking his life. The New York Court
of Appeals held that the rescue effort was not negligent: "[Niegligence
implies some act of commission or omission wrongful in itself,"0 1 and
since the rescuer was under a positive duty to try to save the child's life,
that act could not have been negligent.92  The court's analysis was
Conn. 414 (1870) (injury caused by ice on roadway), liability depended on application
of a statute creating a remedy for injuries caused by "defects" in streets. Whether an ice-
covered street was "defective" "depend[s] upon the means at command, upon general
usage, upon the question whether the defect ... has been long neglected. . . . As the
country advances in wealth and resources and means of improvement many defects...
may become actionable . . . ." Id. at 418-19. A balancing test might be found in the
quoted passage, but the court was interpreting a statute rather than applying the common
law of negligence, and the precedential value of this decision is small. In Beatty v.
Central Iowa Ry., 58 Iowa 242, 12 N.W. 332 (1882), a man was killed when his
unmanageable horse carried him onto a railway track. The court found the mere
presence of the track near a highway could not be negligence, noting in dictum: "'The
price of progress cannot be withheld." Id. at 247-48, 12 N.W. at 334. Plaintiff alleged
no other act that could constitute negligence under a governing statute. Id. at 248, 12
N.W. at 335. In none of the pre-1915 cases cited in RmrATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 291-93 (1965) (Reporter's Notes) is there even a hint of the complex utilitarian
analysis described by the Restatement (Second) which clearly was taken from Terry.
W.L. Prosser, Reporter for the Restatement (Second), in his treatise cites only Terry and
the Restatement for the "fundamental" principle of social utility as a measure of reason-
ableness. W. PRossER, supra note 2, § 31, at 149 n.11. Harper and James cite their own
earlier work, Prosser, and Learned Hand in Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611 (2d Cir.
1940), but no cases before 1915 other than those already discussed. 2 F. HARPER & F.
JAmEs, supra note 4, § 16.9. Harper and James do quote at length from Chicago, B. &
Q.R.R. v. Krayenbuhl, 65 Neb. 889, 903, 91 N.W. 880, 882-83 (1902), the only case
preceding Terry that clearly articulates the modem standard.
89. Terry, supra note 34, at 42-43; see notes 34-36 supra and accompanying text.
90. 43 N.Y. 502 (1871).
91. Id. at 505.
92. Id. at 505-06.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1976/iss3/4
DUE CARE IN NEGLIGENCE
clearly based on the traditional absolute standard of duty, or compliance
with custom. Terry ignored the court's reasoning, however, and ana-
lyzed the utility of the rescuer's act: "the question was of course whether
he [the rescuer] had exposed himself to an unreasonably great risk."93
In Terry's confusing terminology, the thing put at risk by the act in
question is the "principal object" (so called because it is the "object that
the law desires to protect")94 and the goal for which the risk is taken is
called the "collateral object."9  In the Eckert situation, Terry found
that the principal object, the rescuer's life, was very valuable and the
probability of its loss high, but that the collateral object, a child's life,
and the risk of its loss, were also very great; hence the risk undertaken
by the rescuer was reasonable. 96 The values of the two objects, weight-
ed by the probabilities of their realization, were roughly in balance.9 7
Terry's formulation of the utility-of-risk standard in 1915 has been
widely adopted.98 The Restatement of Torts99 follows Terry even in the
use of the terms "factors" and "utility" and in the arbitrary division of
the collateral object's value into three "factors."' 0 While Terry is often
cited among the authorities for a utility standard, however, no modern
writer has noted that the 1915 essay was a major innovation, almost
without support in case law. 10 1 The apparent self-evidence of Terry's
analysis seems to have kept later courts and commentators from
noticing that it was a radical change in the accepted view of negligence.
V. THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE CALCULUS OF RISK
During the century before Terry's essay, courts had been trying to
discern what was or should have been customary behavior in a wide
range of circumstances. Negligence law arose from the application of
principles no more specific than the unamplified requirement of "rea-
son"; principles of more specificity could only have arisen from the slow
codification of what judges and juries found to be reasonable behavior
93. Terry, supra note 34, at 43.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 43-44.
97. Id. at 44.
98. See notes 4-6 supra.
99. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 291 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §
291 (1965).
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291-293.
101. See notes 86-88 supra and accompanying text.
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in varying conditions. It seems an irresistible conclusion, therefore, that
if negligence cases were consistent with a rule of utility, the rule was
taken, not from Bentham-although he supplied the term-but from
the practice of everyday life as it came before the courts in negligence
cases in which the defendants were very often railroads and other large
business enterprises. 102
An illustration of how this may have happened is provided by Chica-
go, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Krayenbuhl,11 a 1902 decision in
which the Nebraska Supreme Court first set out the calculus of risk as a
fundamental principal from which specific rules of behavior were to be
derived. The Krayenbuhl situation was a common one: A child had
been injured while playing on the railroad's turntable which was not
firmly secured by a lock."" In a suit against the railroad for negligence,
verdict and judgment in the trial court were for the child.'00 On appeal,
the plaintiff argued that one of the numerous rules by which negligence
was to be tested, "the doctrine of the turntable cases,"'"0 governed the
situation. The defendant railroad asserted a competing rule-that "the
owner of dangerous premises owes no active duty to trespassing chil-
dren."10 7  The court carefully reviewed the authority for the turntable
doctrine, noting the jurisdictions in which this rule had been adopted
and those in which it had been rejected. 0 8 The court then reviewed the
authorities for the rule regarding the duty of an owner of dangerous
premises, and quoted an earlier Nebraska opinion listing the specific
factual circumstances in which such a duty had been found. 100 The
weight of this authority, the court held, was in favor of a "reaffirmance
of the doctrine of the turntable cases,"" 0 but the court did not stop with
this articulation of a traditional rule or duty standard. To reassure
102. In a random sample of all negligence cases decided between 1875 and 1905 in
the United States, 44 percent involved railroad accidents and 13 percent street railway
accidents; many of the remaining cases involved injuries to employees of industrial
enterprises. Suits between private individuals were sufficiently unusual not to merit
separate tabulation, and the principal nonbusiness defendants were municipalities. Pos-
ner, supra note 26, at 63.
103. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Krayenbuhl, 65 Neb. 889, 91 N.W. 880 (1902).
104. Id. at 898, 91 N.W. at 881.
105. Id. at 899, 91 N.W. at 881.
106. Id. at 900, 91 N.W. at 881.
107. Id. at 901, 91 N.W. at 882.
108. Id. at 900-01, 91 N.W. at 881-82.
109. Id. at 901-02, 91 N.W. at 882.
110. Id. at 902, 91 N.W. at 882.
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prospective defendants that this holding would not impose "unreasona-
ble burdens on owners" of railroad turntables, the court explained the
"true principle upon which cases of this character rest:""'1
It is true, as said in Loomis v. Terry, 17 Wend. [N.Y. Ch.] 496, 500,
31 Am. Dec. [306], 309 [1837], "the business of life must go forward";
the means by which it is carried forward can not be rendered abso-
lutely safe. Ordinarily it can be best carried forward by the unre-
stricted use of private property by the owner; therefore, the law fa-
vors such use to the fullest extent consistent with the main purpose for
which, from a social standpoint, such business is carried forward,
namely, the public good. Hence, in order to determine the extent to
which such use may be enjoyed, its bearing on such main purpose must
be taken into account, and a balance struck between its advantages and
disadvantages. If, on the whole, such use defeats rather than promotes
the main purpose, it should not be permitted; on the other hand, if the
restrictions proposed would so operate, they should not be imposed. The
business of life is better carried forward by the use of dangerous machin-
ery; hence the public good demands its use, although occasionally such
use results in the loss of life or limb. It does so because the danger
is insignificant, when weighed against the benefits resulting from the use
of such machinery, and for the same reason demands its reasonable,
most effective and unrestricted use, up to the point where the benefits
resulting from such use no longer outweigh the danger to be anticipated
from it. At that point the public good demands restrictions. For exam-
ple, a turntable is a dangerous contrivance, which facilitates railroading;
the general benefits resulting from its use outweigh the exceptional in-
juries inflicted by it; hence the public good demands its use. We may
conceive of means by which it might be rendered absolutely safe, but
such means would so interfere with its beneficial use that the danger
to be anticipated would not justify their adoption; therefore the public
good demands its use without them. But the danger incident to its use
may be lessened by the use of a lock which would prevent children, at-
tracted to it, from moving it; the interference with the proper use of the
turntable occasioned by the use of such a lock is so slight that it is out-
weighed by the danger to be ancitipated from an omission to use it;
therefore the public good, we think, demands the use of the lock.112
This is a lucid derivation of the calculus of risk from the premise that
the greatest social good is served by the unrestrained use of private
property-Adam Smith's proposition-and the silent assumption that it
111. Id.
112. Id. at 902-03, 91 N.W. at 882-83.
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is the law's purpose to secure this social good-Bentham's proposition.
From these premises the court deduced that the only restraints it might
impose on the use of private property were those required by the public
good, and, therefore, the benefits of unrestrained business activity must
in each instance be explicitly weighed against the injuries it causes. This
balancing of factors has produced the turntable doctrine and other
such rules, but the balance must be struck on the facts of each case by
the jury, and is not a matter of application of rules of law by the court.
The Krayenbuhl court based the first clear statement of the utility-of-
risk standard of negligence squarely on laissez-faire economic theory,
without citing any authority for that theory. This is not surprising.
By 1902, the theory of The Wealth of Nations, that public good emerges
from private avarice, 113 had been so widely adopted in the class of
society from which judges were likely to be drawn that it was accepted
as unquestioned fact and no longer considered a theory in need of
argument or support. As early as 1884, in a concurring opinion in the
United States Supreme Court," 4 Justice Field expressly identified Adam
Smith's theory with the principles of natural law set forth in the Declara-
tion of Independence." 5 In later years and until 1937, the Supreme
Court went still further in accepting laissez-faire economic theory as a
kind of natural law."" It is therefore unsurprising to find a Nebraska
court in 1902 reciting Adam Smith's theory as if it were a self-evident
truth.
A court could discuss economics in a negligence case without any
incongruity for in Krayenbuhl, as in many negligence cases of the time,
113. See notes 18-22 supra and accompanying text.
114. See Butchers' Union Slaughter-House & Livestock Landing Co. v. Crescent City
Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 756-57 (1884) (Field, J.,
concurring).
115. Among the inalienable rights secured by the Declaration of Independence,
Justice Field found, was the "sacred property" of a man's business employment, id. at
757, quoting A. SmrriH, supra note 18, at 223, which could not be constitutionally
infringed by the granting of a monopoly.
116. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208
U.S. 161 (1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner, Justice
Holmes registered his famous dissent: "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr.
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The Court
continued to incorporate laissez-faire economic theory into constitutional law via the
due process clauses until 1937. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
For a discussion of the substantive due process cases, see C. HAINES, THE REViVAL OF
NATunRA LAW CoNCEPTS 219-32 (1930).
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the defendant was a railroad, and the court was at pains to point out that
its holding represented no great departure from the traditional standard
of customary behavior." 7  For a business enterprise the standard of
care was still the standard of ordinary behavior for a business; profits
and losses were to be computed in the ordinary fashion." 8  Courts
would intervene only in the rare instance in which the defendant's own
profit did not coincide with the social good." 9 The transition from the
rule of custom to a standard of utility was accomplished smoothly and
almost without notice because utility, or profit, was the rule by which
most defendants in negligence cases in fact regulated their behavior. 20
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THE UTILITY STANDARD
The Krayenbuhl decision showed that, beneath the older language of
duty and due care, courts for some time had been applying a test that
required business defendants to internalize risks to the public (and to
their own employees), but did not require them otherwise to depart
from the guiding principle of private profit. As Posner correctly points
out, this tendency of courts in the nineteenth century to require busi-
nesses to invest in safety only to the extent such investments were
profitable 12' did not necessarily mean that there was underinvestment in
safety from society's view.' 2 2 Some injuries were to be tolerated for the
sake of industrialization at a time when industrial activity was necessari-
ly hazardous. Posner demonstrates that in a sample of all cases decided
between 1875 and 1905, the courts behaved as if they were applying the
standard of laissez-faire theory and so should have been aiding the
optimum level of investment in safety by requiring only those protective
measures less costly than the injuries they were meant to forestall.123
In 1906, with enactment of the first Federal Employer's Liability
Act, 24 the doctrine of strict liability began to invade the sphere of neg-
117. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Krayenbuhl, 65 Neb. 889, 902-04, 91 N.W. at 882-83
(1902).
118. Id. at 902, 91 N.W. at 882.
119. Id.
120. Posner, supra note 26, at 73-74.
121. In the sense that the cost of safety measures was less than the cost of satisfying
tort iudgments against them.
122. Posner, supra note 26, at 30.
123. See generally id.
124. Act of June 11, 1906, ch. 3073, 34 Stat. 232-33. (Original act declared
unconstitutional; current version codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970)).
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ligence. Strict liability in workmen's compensation cases was not a re-
treat from laissez-faire principles; like many liberal* modem reforms,
it was amply supported by marketplace economics.' 215 Negligence law
was given an economic rationale, but its structure had been built in ear-
lier times for other purposes, and it was not always suitable for the new
task set by the courts. To secure adequate industrial investment in
safety, rules of strict liability were necessary, as an examination of the
Krayenbuhl situation reveals.
The Krayenbuhl court had no difficulty deciding that the trivial cost
and inconvenience of padlocking a turntable were justified and should
be required of the railroad while the expense of preventing all possible
injuries to children was not. The court was not forced to consider more
difficult cases between these extremes. What if the railroad had provid-
ed a padlock which was repeatedly broken open by other children? In a
suit over a resulting injury, should a court have found that watchmen
were also required? Alarm systems? To prove the need for such
systems, or even the need for padlocks, plaintiffs should present enough
information to allow a court to determine the frequency of accidents in
all turntables in its jurisdiction, the cost of these accidents in dollars, and
the efficacy of various possible safety measures. In each suit for
negligence the court could then determine whether, in that instance,
there was available to the defendant a protective measure less costly than
the injuries that otherwise would have occurred. To avoid liability for
negligence, all business enterprises would have to undertake such calcu-
lations to determine the level of protection against injury to employees
125. See note 130 infra and accompanying text. Workmen's compensation statutes
were wisely enacted in the early years of the twentieth century. REPORT OF THn
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 33-35 (1972).
"Based on the enterprise liability theory, state workmen's compensation statutes attempt
to shift the burden of industrial accidents from the employee to the employer, and
ultimately to the consumers." Kelley, Statutes of Limitations in the Era of Compensa-
tion Systems: Workmen's Compensation Limitations Provisions for Accidental Injury
Claims, 1974 WAsH. U.L.Q. 541, 552. The legislative choice of compensation scheme,
rather than a system of regulation, is entirely in accord with the laissez-faire theory
enunciated in Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Krayenbuhl, 65 Neb. 889, 91 N.W. 880 (1902).
Liberal reforms like the workmen's compensation statutes and modem product liability
theories were based on the same economic and political theories we today identify with
conservatism. Smith and Bentham are great figures in British Liberal philosophy, see L.
HOBHOUSE, supra note 23, and laissez-faire theory is also the basis of the variety of
United States liberalism, which was sought to set a middle course between socialism and
toryism. See A. WALWoRTH, WooDRow WILSON (1969); G. Wrnis, NIXON AGONISTrs
(1970).
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and the public. Such calculations would be enormously complex and
difficult: A business enterprise, unable to know in advance what injuries
should be prevented, would be forced to examine separately the feasibil-
ity of preventing each possible accident.
In many, perhaps most, negligence actions there would be insufficient
information to make even a guess about the relative social costs and
benefits of prevention before an injury occurred. Neither defendants
nor courts, therefore, could easily apply the standard of utility,'26 but
clear and certain standards were needed. As the Krayenbuhl court
recognized, the costs of forestalling accidents might easily become intol-
erable to small companies engaged in vigorous competition and to
society as a whole if such costs hampered industrial production. 127
The Krayenbuhl standard would work well to prevent serious acci-
dents of a kind known to occur frequentiy when a cheap and simple
preventive like a padlock was available. The frequency of such acci-
dents would be known in approximate terms from previous litigation, as
in the turntable cases, and the trivial cost of prevention would be self-
evident. Courts faced a far more difficult task in cases of singular,
severe accidents, when the burden of prevention throughout an industry
was unclear. Uncertainty in any one case could be resolved arbitrarily
by a jury, but courts would eventually have to reconcile the inconsisten-
cies among jury determinations. As in Krayenbuhl, an appellate court
would have to examine explicitly the costs and benefits of safety meas-
ures.
In the years before liability insurance had become ubiquitous, when
governmental recordkeeping was still limited, actuarial data were very
sparse. Outside the records kept by businesses of their own experience,
126. See Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949) (L. Hand, J.):
The difficulties . . . arise from the necessity of applying a quantitative test
to an incommensurable subject-matter . . . It is indeed possible to state an
equation for negligence . ... But of these factors care is the only one ever
susceptible to quantitative estimate, and often that is not. The injuries are
always a variable within limits, which do not admit of even approximate ascer-
tainment; and, although probability might theoretically be estimated, if any
statistics were available, they never are; and, besides, probability varies with
the severity of the injuries. It follows that all such attempts are il-
lusory ....
See also Epstein, supra note 12, at 157; Posner, supra note 28, at 218 (agreeing with
Epstein that satisfactory information is rarely available, though disputing the significance
of the fact).
127. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Krayenbuhl, 65 Neb. 889, 902, 91 N.W. 880, 882
(1902).
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little or no information about the frequency or severity of accidents was
available.' 2 s In a specific case a court would be faced with the compet-
ing claims of a single injured individual as against those of the entire
industry on which the cost of the required safety measure would fall.
Except for precautions of trivial cost, such as a padlock, the expense to
be borne by an entire industry over a long period of time could easily
outweigh the cost of injuries to a single individual. The ordinary
adversary proceeding would therefore create a heavy bias against the
plaintiff, when the defendant was a business enterprise, particularly at a
time when plaintiffs and courts had not yet made explicit the terms to be
weighed in a utility-of-risk standard, and when the weight of the tradi-
tional adherence-to-custom standard was still great. In such circum-
stances the bias of the courts must have been toward imposing only very
modest precautions on business activity, thereby requiring far less than
the optimum safety investment.
Large business enterprises did not face the difficulty that confronted
the courts in determining costs and benefits, for a big business had its
own records of accidents and the means to prevent them. Business
enterprises served their own purposes, however, not those of society
at large and would not undertake optimum safety measures unless
compelled to do so by law. Legislatures could not dictate the safety
measures to be undertaken, for the same reason that courts had diffi-
culty in applying the utility-of-risk standard in negligence cases: Only
the defendants had the knowledge and the resources to make the re-
quired calculations.' 29
According to laissez-faire economic theory, the desired result could
128. Cf. Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949) (statistics on probabili-
ty of injuries never available to courts).
129. See Baxter, The SST: From Watts to Harlem in Two Hours, 21 STAN. L. RV.
1, 55 (1968). Baxter argues that imposing costs on the airlines is superior to direct
government regulation in dealing with the damages caused by sonic booms. His
rationale is twofold. First, there are high administrative costs in extracting information
from the industry so that government regulators can impose proper controls. Second,
and more important, the industry is the best source of information on which controls are
optimal. Regulation creates a disincentive for the industry to produce such data; cost
imposition, or strict liability, 'rovides a positive incentive for the industry to seek the
most efficient solution to sonic booms. Id. Baxter's analysis, if valid, is equally
applicable to all large industries. Cf. Calabresi & Hirsehoff, supra note 11, at 1060-63
(advocating cost imposition on the party best able to generate information on the
economically optimum solution to a social cost, and suggesting that large industry will
often be that party).
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be obtained simply by imposing strict liability.13 0 Legislatures or courts
needed only to force business people to calculate-to internalize-all
costs of injuries caused by their activity. Under a strict liability stand-
ard, injuries to the public would become another business cost, and
entrepreneurs would devote their ingenuity by reducing that cost to a
minimum. Firms most effective in reducing the cost of safety would
130. So far as economic theory is concerned, it does not matter which of the parties
to an accident is held liable. The party risking liability will, according to theory, take
justifiable measures to prevent accidents and the outcome will be the same under a rule
of fault, of strict liability or no liability at all-in which the injured party bears the cost.
See W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, PUBLIC Lxw PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROBLEM 58-
60 (1965); Blum & Kalven, The Empty Cabinet of Dr. Calabresi: Auto Accidents &
General Deterrence, 34 U. CH. L. REv. 239, 246-49 (1967). There has nevertheless
been a brisk argument over the merits of strict liability for business enterprise in which
the proponents of strict liability have tried to show its superiority on strictly economic
terms, as a more efficient means of allocating resources. See, e.g., Calabresi, Some
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
Calabresi concedes the theoretical equivalence of fault and strict liability in the econo-
mist's imaginary realm of rational decision makers, but seeks to justify enterprise liability
on practical grounds, arguing that employees (and presumably consumers) do not make
rational decisions and in any case are unable fully to impose their decisions on business
enterprises. Id. at 505-07. Calabresi also argues that it is easier or less expensive for
the business enterprise to prevent accidents, see notes 11 & 129 supra, but this is
merely an assumption about where fault usually lies, not an argument against a standard
of fault. A more common justification of modern enterprise liability is that this
doctrine yields a result equivalent to accident insurance: the risk of accident is
spread over the class of consumers. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to
the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 800 (1966) ("The 'risk-distributing' theory . . .
has been an almost universal favorite with the professors. . . ."). The theoretical equiv-
alence of liability for fault and enterprise liability has led commentators into odd specula-
tions concerning the court's preference for negligence. Calabresi, for instance, argued
that nineteenth century courts believed a subsidy to expanding industry was needed and
points out that twentieth century welfare economics would support such a result if
expansion was economically justified. Calabresi, supra at 509. The railroads of the
late nineteenth century were, however, by no means in need of expansion. The panic
of 1893 and the ensuing depression are attributed to overcapacity in the railroad
industry, see M. JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS 375-78 (2d ed. 1962), nor were the
railroads so universally favored by courts as this view assumes them to have been. Cf.
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876) (states may regulate the charges of public
utilities); see also M. JOSEPHSON, supra, passim. The view urged in the text requires
fewer unsupported assumptions: The negligence law of the late nineteenth century grew
quite naturally out of the earlier negligence standard based on custom; the bias in favor
of defendants was a reflection of this origin and of the disability plaintiffs had in
assembling the information needed to show that common risks were unjustified. A rule of
strict liability might have produced a better economic result, but that is a question for
hindsight.
Whether negligence or strict liability is preferable at the present time is a question
outside the scope of this Note.
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be the most profitable; businesses with too much or too little investment
in safety would founder under the weight of protective devices or be
bankrupted by tort claims. Negligence law could not accomplish this
internalization of accident costs because courts were unable to deter-
mine the socially optimum level of investment and so could not impose
it as a requirement of law. Strict liability relieved the courts of respon-
sibility for such decisions; the salutary effects claimed for the operation
of a free market were to be obtained simply by holding business firms
liable for all accidents. Each efficient firm would then minimize its own
accident costs; the inefficient ones would vanish; the benefit to society
would be maximized. Laissez-faire economic theory, which had given
new and persuasive meaning to the standard of reasonable care, thus
undercut the basis of negligence itself.
Strict enterprise liability 1' is preferable to negligence only in certain
limited circumstances. 132 The defendants must be firms operating in
a competitive free market; each firm must be large enough to deter-
mine its own optimum level of investment in safety; each firm must
have liability insurance or must be large enough to pay the occasional
large judgments for damages which result when only the optimum
investment is made; finally, the defendant must be able to prevent
injuries at least as cheaply as the plaintiff. When these conditions are
fulfilled, and strict liability is imposed on all firms in a market uni-
formly, each firm will make the optimum investment in safety and the
social good, in economic terms, will be steadily maximized.
All the conditions must be met simultaneously. When it is easier
for plaintiffs to avoid being injured than for defendants to protect them,
131. There are many kinds of strict liability. Liability without fault and without
limitation on amount is imposed by the common law on hazardous activity, Rylands v.
Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868); Whitman Hotel Corp. v. Elliott & Watrous Eng'r Co.,
137 Conn. 562, 79 A.2d 591 (1951). Liability without fault, but with limitations on the
amount of any claim is imposed by workmen's compensation statutes, see note 125
supra; liability without fault but permitting defenses equivalent to contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk has been proposed. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs §§
519-24 (1965). Liability without fault but with a defense of "unforeseeable damage" or
lack of proximate cause is occasionally employed, see cases cited in Polk v. Ford Motor
Co., 529 F.2d 259, 264-66 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2229 (1976). See generally
Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 11; Vetri, Products Liability: The Developing
Framework for Analysis, 54 ORE. L. REV. 293 (1975). RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) or
TORTS § 402A (1965), also proposes a form of liability without fault for injuries caused
by "defective" products. Common to all forms of strict liability is the notion that the
defendant in at least some circumstances functions as an insurer.
132. See notes 133-35 infra and accompanying text.
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plaintiffs should be denied recovery according to economic theory;133
in such cases negligence law and the common-law defense of contribu-
tory negligence are suitable. When both parties are natural persons,
neither plaintiffs nor defendants have a uniform cost advantage in
avoiding accidents. When a plaintiff is a natural person and defendant
is a large business corporation, we tend to assume, rightly or wrongly,
that the conditions have been fulfilled, and rarely consider whether a
free market is operating.1-4  When a defendant is a very large corpora-
tion, or has liability insurance, we may reasonably suppose the defend-
ant is large enough to comply with the criteria. It is interesting to note
that strict liability began to appear at a time when large business cor-
porations became visibly dominant'33 and when liability insurance first
became widespread. 136
Strict liability has been imposed on defendants who as a class
ordinarily can prevent injuries more cheaply than plaintiffs; defendants
held strictly liable include manufacturers of nationally distributed
consumer goods, 13' employers of injured workmen, 3 8 and common
carriers." 9 A form of contributory negligence defense is often com-
133. See Posner, supra note 26, at 33.
134. Many industries are dominated by a few large firms with substantial market
power who may be able to pass along costs of injuries to the public without being under
any compulsion to reduce those costs. See generally 1. BLAIR, ECONOMIC
CONCENTRATION: STRUCTURE, BEHAVIOR & PUBLIC POLICY (1972). In such situations
strict liability for business enterprises shifts the burden of injuries from plaintiffs to
consumers in general, but does not encourage any investment in safety measures.
135. The years from 1895 to 1905 saw rapid consolidation of business enterprises into
the first nationwide corporations:
Five of these years, 1898-1902, saw a burst of merger activity never exceeded
in importance in our history, with 1,028 firms disappearing into mergers in
1899 alone. The huge turn-of-the-century merger wave produced U.S. Steel,
American Tobacco, International Harvester, Du Pont, Corn Products, Ana-
conda Copper, and American Smelting and Refining, to name only a few.
Its effect on American industry was widespread and enduring.
R. NELSON, MERGER MOVEMENTS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY, 1895-1956, at 34 (1959).
Eight broad industries mergers during this decade accounted for more than 40 percent of
the capitalization of each industry as a whole. Id. at 172.
136. "[L]iability insurance originatfed] within the last twenty years . ... " W.
VANCE, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF INSURANCE 604 (1904).
137. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d
436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
138. See note 125 supra.
139. Common carriers were required by the common law to exercise the "highest
possible care" to passengers and were made insurers of goods entrusted to them. W.
PROSSER, supra note 2, § 34, at 180.
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bined with strict liability when injuries are of a kind that plaintiffs can
more easily or cheaply prevent, 40 and with a foreseeability limitation
when injuries are of a kind that the defendant either could not have
taken into account or could not have prevented. 4' All this is consistent
with the laissez-faire economic theory that in other circumstances sup-
ports traditional negligence rules.
To say that strict liability, or a utility-of-risk standard of negligence,
is consistent with laissez-faire economic theory is not to say that it
should be adopted as law. One must first confront the question
whether the theory is correct. Many people have concluded that it is
not.142 Economic conditions have altered considerably over the past
two hundred years, and even if laissez-faire economic theory is correct
when applied to small, competing firms and unorganized workers, it
may not be valid when applied to a modem industrial economy in which
government is the largest economic unit, private enterprise is domi-
nated by large corporations, and workers in some industries are or-
ganized into powerful unions.'48
If we accept the free-market economic theory as correct, however,
then it follows that when a defendant is a large business enterprise, and
the plaintiff is a natural person unable to guide his or her conduct by
complex calculations of utility, the rule that produces the greatest social
good in economic terms is a rule of strict liability. This follows simply
from the assumptions that the defendant acts from economic motives,
seeks maximum profit, and has enough information available to make
correct decisions. In some instances small businesses with liability in-
surance will fulfill the same conditions, at least to the extent the enter-
prise can make use of the information available to the insurer.
In disputes among persons with motives other than profit who are
140. The plaintiff's behavior has been allowed as a defense in many strict liability
cases. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 102 and cases collected therein. Generally, the
manufacturer will be liable unless his product was abnormally or negligently used, or the
plaintiff assumed the risk. If there is a pattern in these decisions, it seems that the
manufacturer is held liable when he might more easily than the defendant have prevented
the accident, or might with reasonable ease have prevented all such accidents.
141. See cases cited in Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259, 264-66 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 2229 (1976).
142. A large part of the world has adopted a competing theory. See E. MANDEL,
MARXIST ECONOMIC THEORY (1968); K. MAnx, DAS KAPrrAL (1867).
143. In the United States, market-theory economics is not universally accepted, T.
VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTmRPIUSE (1904), nor is it always seen as
applicable to modem times. J. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE
(1973).
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unable to make the complex calculations that economic self-interest
requires,"'4 utilitarian theory provides little guidance. Both utility-of-
risk and strict liability standards allow one consciously to risk another's
life or health in the search for private profit. The law grudgingly con-
cedes that rescuers may reasonably endanger their own person or prop-
erty for the benefit of another,' but imposes no obligation to take any
action whatever: one may, for example, with legal impunity sit by and
watch another drown.146  This absence of any legal duty to rescue,
it is often observed, 4 7 runs against common morality. Not so often
noted is that the law balances self-interest equally against the interests
of others, which is also contrary to commonly espoused values. Strict
liability and negligence, both expressions of the effort to produce the
greatest economic good, produce the same moral anomalies.
144. See notes 31-39 supra and accompanying text.
145. See Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (1908). The contrary rule is more
frequently asserted: one may endanger or injure others for the sake of one's own
property. Toledo, P. & W. Ry. v. Pindar, 53 IMI. 447 (1870) (plaintiff contributorily
negligent for rescuing a horse instead of cash from a burning building):
It is incomprehensible to us, that where it was so accessible and easily secured,
no effort was made to remove the money. Unless [plaintiff] was careless or
even reckless, we suppose his first thought would have been of the money.
Unless indifferent of his loss, we do not comprehend why [plaintiff] should
have thought of the horses, of comparatively small value, and not of so
large a sum of money. Such a course of action would seem to imply a high
degree of indifference to his interest or strong feelings of humanity; but if
the latter, we are not prepared to say [defendants] should be prejudiced
thereby.
Id. at 451. Ste also Posner, Killing or Wounding to Protect a Property Interest, 14 J.L.
&EcoN. 201 (1971) (analysis in terms of economic utility).
146. See OsterIlind v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 160 N.E. 301 (1928); Yania v. Bigan, 397
Pa. 316, 155 A.2d 343 (1959); cases collected in W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 56,
at 340-41. Contra, Eckert v. Long Island R.R., 43 N.Y. 502 (1871).
147. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 56, at 340 (calling the majority rule
"ahocking").
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